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In 96 A.D., Emperor Domitian was assassinated by a group organized
by his chamberlain Parthenius.1 Although Domitian had numerous
supporters in the army, Suetonius records that the political establishment of
the time did not feel any great sympathy for the murdered Domitian:
The Senators on the contrary were so overjoyed, that they raced to fill the
House, where they did not refrain from assailing the dead Emperor with the
most insulting and stinging kind of outcries. They even had ladders brought
and his shields and images torn down before their eyes and dashed upon the
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ground. Finally they passed a decree that his inscriptions should everywhere be
erased, and all record of him obliterated.2

These initial attacks upon the images and symbols of Domitian were the
first stages of a legal damnatio memoriae against him.3 The damnatio
declared that the memory of Domitian would be stricken from the history of
Rome. His edicts and words were not to be given legal force; his images
and symbolic legacy were to be extirpated.4 The damnatio was intended
to erase Domitian, insofar as that was possible, from what was taken as a
history of glory and rightful rule.5 The extent to which this was possible,
even in first century Rome, should not be overstated; the reality of
Domitian’s rule was not, and could not be, literally removed from memory.
Suetonius, after all, wrote down both the fact of the damnatio and the
reasons why it was appropriate.6 The goal of the damnatio, instead, was
to make that memory shameful—to invert the respect given to the deified
rulers that had studded the past of Rome and that now formed the stock
of rhetorical reference points that could be used in Rome’s present
governance.7 The damnatio, in short, was intended as a political statement
about the future of the Roman people and that this future should
emphatically not include any reference to the aberrant acts and ideas of
emperors such as Domitian.8
These ideas are not obviously relevant to the discussion of international
criminal law. International criminal law is often understood as fulfilling
the function of offering up a place for memory, rather than for forgetting
and for shame.9 Instead, I want to defend the idea that one powerful
justifying explanation for some forms of international criminal law is as
a sort of modern-day damnatio memoriae, in which the memory of the
acts and ideas of those who have transgressed against basic moral norms
is to be extirpated from political memory. Not, I should say again, literally;
the function of criminal law here is not to hide the memory of evil or the
2. Id. at 361.
3. See ERIC R. VARNER, MUTILATION AND TRANSFORMATION: DAMNATIO MEMORIAE
AND ROMAN IMPERIAL PORTRAITURE 111 (2004) (summarizing Domitian’s reign and the
senate’s decision to “abolish his memory”).
4. See SUETONIUS, supra note 1, at 361; VARNER, supra note 3, at 111.
5. SUETONIUS, supra note 1, at 361; VARNER, supra note 3, at 111.
6. See SUETONIUS, supra note 1, at 356–58, 360–61.
7. See VARNER, supra note 3, at 2 (discussing the practice of damnatio memoriae
and its intended purpose); see also Sarah E. Bond, Op-Ed., Erasing the Face of History,
N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2011, at WK8 (discussing Egypt’s removal of all images of ousted
president Hosni Mubarak and the historical practice of erasure in Egypt and Rome).
8. See VARNER, supra note 3, at 111. For a discussion of the damnatio and its
functions, see John Pollini, 88 ART BULL. 590 (2006) (reviewing VARNER, supra note 3).
9. See, e.g., LUDOVIC HENNEBEL & THOMAS HOCHMANN, GENOCIDE DENIALS AND
THE LAW (2011).
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corrupt rationales of those who committed it. The function is, instead, to
remove certain ideas and persons from the stock of received reference
points that can be cited in ordinary democratic politics in the future. The
goal of international criminal condemnation, on this view, is democratic
in nature, and it functions by limiting the space of those ideas and
references that can be put forward in public without civic shame. There
are, after all, ideas and persons, events and histories, that can be cited as
justifying reasons within any democratic community, and those that
cannot. Lawyers cite Brown v. Board of Education; they tend to avoid
justifying their claims with reference to Dred Scott. Politicians—whether
left or right—find homes for their ideas in the words of Winston Churchill;
comparatively fewer look for antecedents in the ideas of Neville
Chamberlain. The function of the modern damnatio is to limit forever
the stock of persons and ideas that can be put forward in a political
community, by making certain persons and certain ideas damned and
damnable. When international criminal law condemns criminals on this
account, it does so not because the persons involved deserve to be
punished—although, on the account I give here, they certainly do not
deserve to be free from that punishment. Nor does it punish because
such punishment will directly incentivize future would-be war criminals
into rethinking their plans. International criminal law, on my account, is
justified with reference to the future democratic deliberations of the
political community that is to be constituted in part by the legal
deliberations of that criminal tribunal. We punish, on this account,
because punishment here communicates a message to future democratic
participants, and that message is one of shame—of what should never
again be spoken of as anything other than shameful.
It follows, on this account, that the possible explanations for why
international criminal law is justified—when it is justified—might go
considerably further afield than conventional accounts of the justification of
punishment. The function of international criminal law, on my account,
is constitutional, in a way that most ordinary forms of legal punishment
are not. The punishment we offer in the international case is one that
involves the creation, in whole or in part, of a new legal community
emerging out of violence and evil. The account of international criminal
law I offer here involves a justification appropriate only to this context
and makes the punitive aspect of international criminal law only
indirectly relevant. What we are doing in international criminal law is
creating a new constitution—if, by this term, we include both legal
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norms and the public norms surrounding how we are to use and interpret
those legal norms. As such, it is open to us to question whether punishment
in the ordinary sense is even a necessary part of international criminal law
at all.
I will not, however, follow up this last suggestion in the present Article.
For simplicity’s sake, I will assume that we are discussing in the present
context only one particular form of international criminal institution, the
International Criminal Court (ICC). I will further assume that we
understand this court to have the nature, power, and jurisdiction—both
personal and subject matter—that it currently does.10 I would argue that
the ICC might be justified as a sort of constitutional damnatio in three
Parts. The first will discuss two ways of looking at the court and why
the conventional justifications of punishment might not be adequate to
justify what the court is doing. The second will examine the issue of the
politically unspeakable and argue that the court’s mandate might indeed
be the responsibility of making certain ideas and persons politically
shameful. The final Part will try to give some justification for the claim
that this mandate might give rise to a justification for the court’s existence.
On the account I provide here, even if the court could not be justified
with reference to the traditional notions of punishment, it might not be
wronging those it punishes; those who commit radical evil might have
no claim to be free from being used in the constitutional process of political
reconstruction. If this argument is correct, then those who are damned
by the court may be legitimately used as sites on which the constitutional
history of the society in question is rebuilt; they are rendered shameful,
and that shame may help build a new social world in which such
shameful acts and actors will not recur.
I. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND THE JUSTIFICATION OF
PUNISHMENT
There are at least two ways of justifying the practices and institutions
of international criminal law. The first takes them as being continuous,
in function and in justification, with domestic institutions of punishment.
They may differ, of course, in their precise jurisdictional reach, or their
powers, or their procedures. They are, on this view, akin in what makes
them justifiable; the moral test for one applies with equal weight to the
other. Call this the continuity view. The alternative, of course, is to think of
10. I will also be avoiding a discussion of the crime of aggression, which the ICC
will eventually take up within its jurisdictional ambit. See Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court art. 5, § 2, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter
Rome Statute].

908

[VOL. 50: 905, 2013]

Shame, Memory, and the Unspeakable
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

these institutions as radically discontinuous, in aim and in justifying
rationale. What they are trying to do is sufficiently different, on this view,
that we should not use theories developed to justify the one in the task of
justifying the other. We can call this, naturally, the discontinuity view.
I will defend, of course, the discontinuity view. I want to examine the
continuity view, though, and see if we can justify the ICC with reference
to the same norms and ideas we use to justify domestic institutions of
punishment. We should be careful here to distinguish between a conclusion
that the ICC is unjustified on these norms and ideas and the conclusion
that such norms and ideas are not the appropriate basis for the evaluation
of the ICC. I want to remain open to the possibility that the ICC is best
understood as a punishing institution much like a domestic court and
that the ICC is right now not especially justifiable on the theories we use
to justify domestic courts. Nevertheless, if we cannot justify the ICC on
these theories, I believe we have at the very least some reason to look
elsewhere and see if some other sorts of theories give us a better chance
to show the ICC as justifiable.
So, what sorts of reasons do we generally give to justify domestic
punishment? The canonical answer, of course, is to divide justifications
into retributive and deterrence-based ones and then examine them both
in turn.11 I think this distinction is often harder to make than we tend to
think; many people defend punishment with reference to future
consequences for the protection of basic rights, a view that falls neither
comfortably within the retributive line nor comfortably within the general
description of utilitarianism and deterrence.12 We can, though, use this
distinction as it stands and see how able we might be to use these ideas
to justify what it is that the ICC is trying to do. We can make these sorts
of reasons more precise by making them describe what it is that makes
the punishment rightful in each case. The retributive theory says, we
punish you because you deserve to be punished; there exist basic rules
that determine what individuals are entitled to have, and insofar as you
have transgressed against those rules, so shall we rightly transgress against

11. See, e.g., Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution
as an Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1315–17
(2000) (discussing the relationships between retribution and the utilitarian justifications of
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation).
12. See, e.g., Markus Dirk Dubber, Toward a Constitutional Law of Crime and
Punishment, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 509, 568 (2004) (discussing the “harm principle”).
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those rules protecting you.13 The deterrent theory, in contrast, says, we
punish you for our protection; the future will be a better one if rules
protecting our interests or rights are in place, and the existence of the
pain of punishment is justified with reference to the greater protection
those interests or rights shall receive.14
These thumbnail sketches are obviously subject to a great deal of
interpretive detail, and different theorists will undoubtedly find much to
disagree with in what I have just said. I want to avoid these discussions,
though, and focus instead on whether or not we could use these broad
outlines to justify international criminal law. Is it plausible to think that
institutions such as the ICC are justified with reference to these ideas?
We can start by looking at retribution. The justification of the ICC
would seem to be easily made with reference to retribution; those who
commit radical evil, after all, have transgressed against the bodies and
lives of others in a foundational way. Surely we can justify the imposition
of harm against those persons with reference to the idea of some sort of
reciprocity between the victim and aggressor, as retribution imagines.
There are worries, though, about the use of retributive reasoning as a
justification for the ICC as an institution. Legal punishment, after all, is
not just a matter of one individual deciding, rightly or not, to cause harm
to another in the name of justice. It is, instead, done from within a system of
rules that state collectively what may justly be done and what shall occur
when these primary rules are violated. Thus, a justified retributive
system must be one in which there is fairness not simply between the
victim and aggressor in the process of legal punishment but between
potential recipients of punishment in respect to allocation. This may
prove to cause some problems before we can think of the ICC as justifiable
as an instrument of retribution. In the first place, fairness between potential
subjects of retribution would seem to require that like cases be treated
alike. This is emphatically not the case in international criminal law.
The United States, most notably, is functionally immune from international
criminal procedure, both legally in virtue of its P-5 rights in the Security
Council and functionally in virtue of its military supremacy.15 What
punishing actions the ICC has done have been uniformly directed against

13. See Cotton, supra note 11, at 1317.
14. See id. at 1316.
15. See Richard Dicker, A Flawed Court in Need of Credibility, N.Y. TIMES (May
21, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/22/opinion/a-flawed-court-in-need-of-cred
ibility.html (discussing perceived flaws in the administration of international justice due
to the dominance of some P-5 countries).
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criminals from impoverished African nations.16 This is not, I should
emphasize, to impugn the court itself as unjustified; I do not want to say
that. I want to say only that the court is unlikely to be easily justified with
reference to the norms of fairness implicit within the idea of retribution.
I would further add that the retributive ideal places the notion of systemic
legal punishment within a wider framework of rights protection.17 This
might impugn some domestic institutions of punishment, but it outright
damns the punitive practices of the international community, which exist
against a backdrop of inefficient collective response to atrocity, widespread
collaboration with exploitative and brutal regimes, and widespread refusal
to accept any risk at all for the sake of foreign human rights protection.18
On this view, we should be extremely hesitant before we seek to justify
the ICC through the terms used to justify domestic legal institutions of
punishment; these latter institutions tend to involve practices markedly
absent from the former, and to reduce the one to the other is to risk
making the ICC less justifiable than it might truly be.19
I do not want to overstate my conclusion here; it might be the case that
the ICC is best viewed as an imperfect but hopeful development and that
it might one day become truly justified as a retributive institution.
I believe this optimism is mistaken—the advantages of the United States
over the Central African Republic are unlikely to disappear any time
soon—but do not want to insist on the point too strongly. I will, instead,
take these difficulties as reasons to think that the ICC might be understood
as doing something rather different from what domestic courts do. Before
examining that, though, we might look at the issue of deterrence. Can
we not justify the practices of the ICC with reference to the consequential
calculus of pain and benefit? Pain is, after all, an unwelcome thing; if

16. Solomon Dersso, The International Criminal Court’s Africa Problem, AL
JAZEERA, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/06/201369851918549.html
(last modified June 11, 2013, 8:03 PM).
17. I have elsewhere defended the view that rightful punishment occurs only
against a backdrop of effective police services. See Michael Blake, International Criminal
Adjudication and the Right To Punish, 11 PUB. AFF. Q. 203, 206, 209 (1997).
18. See Michelle Kwon, The Inefficiency of International Justice, GEO. J. INT’L
AFF. BLOG (Apr. 18, 2012), http://journal.georgetown.edu/2012/04/18/the-inefficiencyof-international-justice-by-michelle-kwon/ (discussing the apparent lack of deterrence
and rehabilitation provided through the international justice system).
19. These conclusions are echoed by Deirdre Golash, The Justification of Punishment
in the International Context, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 201,
221–23 (Larry May & Zachary Hoskins eds., 2010).
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threatened with pain, will the war criminals of the world not learn
somewhat better behavior? If so, then the justification of the ICC might
be continuous with the justification of domestic courts, at least when
those courts are thought of as institutions of deterrence. Both the ICC
and ordinary courts try to make the world a better place for potential
victims, by making the world more uncomfortable for would-be abusers.
The difficulty with this calculation, of course, is the same thing that is
difficult about any real-world calculation involving complex institutions
and multiple actors: we simply do not know a great deal about the likely
effects of institutions such as the ICC. This is a difference in degree,
rather than in kind, from domestic law; we are also often ignorant about
the effects of law, for example, the endless debates on the deterrent
effects of the death penalty,20 but more profoundly ignorant about the
likely results of novel institutions such as the ICC. There are, moreover,
reasons to think that the ability of the ICC to incentivize good behavior
on the part of future war criminals is likely to be minimal at best. In the
first instance, the simple fact of numbers is difficult to ignore. The ICC
has, as I write this, only one conviction, and the result of that conviction
has been a sentence of fourteen years.21 Given the context in which many
war criminals exist—a context of social and institutional breakdown,
ongoing violence and atrocity, and bloody competition for power and
security—it is safe to say that the worry factor of a possible indictment
in The Hague may not be at the forefront of the criminal’s calculations.
It is worthwhile to note that neither of the most high profile figures
indicted by international tribunals—Slobodan Milošević and Muammar
Gaddafi—was punished by the tribunal; Milošević died of natural causes,
and Gaddafi died from violence in the street.22 Potential war criminals
are likely to see this trend and think—not unreasonably—that it is likely
to continue.
20. Compare Richard B. Roper, The Death Penalty at the Intersection of Reality
and Justice, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 15, 18–20, 31 (2008) (arguing that the death penalty
serves as a valid deterrent), with Allan D. Johnson, Note, The Illusory Death Penalty:
Why America’s Death Penalty Process Fails To Support the Economic Theories of
Criminal Sanctions and Deterrence, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1101, 1120–28 (2001) (arguing
that the current death penalty appeals process eliminates any deterrent effect from capital
punishment).
21. Thomas Escritt, Insight: International Court’s Credibility in Dock over Failed
Prosecutions, REUTERS (Mar. 19, 2013, 9:14 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03
/19/us-warcrimes-court-credibility-insight-idUSBRE92I0I120130319.
22. See Prosecutor v. Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Case No. ICC01/11-01/11, Decision to Terminate the Case (Nov. 22, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/
iccdocs/doc/doc1274559.pdf; Kareem Fahim et al., Qaddafi, Seized by Foes, Meets a
Violent End, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2011, at A1; Milosevic ‘Died of Natural Causes,’
CNN (Apr. 5, 2006), http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/04/05/milosevic.death/.
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To the extent that the ICC does lead to a change in the calculation
matrix of a given criminal, moreover, it is not clear that the change is
one we have reason to value. Leslie Vinjamuri has argued that the threats
of the ICC may make the criminal more resilient by heightening the
costs of transitioning away from power.23 It is not clear that such reasoning
is true; Kathryn Sikkink has argued powerfully that those fears are
overstated.24 The main point here is that the justifiability of the ICC, on
the deterrent picture discussed here, is at best undecided. We have reason to
think that the precise consequences of the ICC are difficult, if not
impossible, to gauge with any degree of accuracy. This means that the
ultimate justification for the ICC is similarly indeterminate; we will not
be able to rest easy with the institution’s viability until we are aware of
what changes it is actually likely to make.
All this, of course, presupposes that the deterrent function of the ICC
is a function we are morally permitted to exercise. Deterrence in general,
though, reflects consequentialist ideas that many—myself included—
find difficult to wholeheartedly endorse.25 It is one thing for us to say
that the ICC actually does cause good results. It is quite another for us
to think that we are permitted to achieve these results in this manner, by
using violence against these persons. Imagine, for example, that the United
States proposed using targeted drone strikes against suspected human
rights abusers in Africa. Setting aside prudential worries about the
likelihood of the drone program being done well, I suspect many of us
would be worried about the legitimacy of the program’s being undertaken at
all. Even if it were effective, it might be impermissible as a violation of
the rights of those it proposed to kill. I raise this not as a decisive objection
to the deterrent theory of punishment—the theory has too much plausibility
to be dispelled that easily—but because it demonstrates that efficiency in
getting good results cannot be the only consideration in the justification
of punishment. This means, in turn, that many of the concerns discussed
above under the heading of retribution—the fairness of the system that
imposes the punishment, most notably, given the disparity between the
23. Leslie Vinjamuri, Peace May Require Forgoing Justice, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.
nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/03/04/can-we-afford-to-forgive-atrocities/peace-mayrequire-forgoing-justice (last updated Dec. 13, 2013, 11:39 AM).
24. KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE CASCADE: HOW HUMAN RIGHTS PROSECUTIONS
ARE CHANGING WORLD POLITICS 26–27 (2011).
25. See, e.g., David Dolinko, “Using Persons” and the Justification of Punishment, 38
RUTGERS L. REC. 1 (2011).
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United States and the Central African Republic—may recur under the
heading of deterrence.
So, what to conclude? I suspect the first conclusion is that the ICC is
not, right now, as easily justified as the institutions of domestic legal
punishment. That may not be the most interesting of conclusions. I want to
go beyond it, though, and suggest that this should not be the final word
about the legitimacy of the ICC. On my view, the ICC is considerably
more legitimate than the above picture might suggest. As a way of
motivating this, I want to briefly examine the idea that punishment is not
simply harsh treatment, given as a way of either causing good conduct or
rewarding bad conduct. It does not simply do something. It does, instead,
say something—it has propositional content. When we punish, we do
not simply do a thing; we are, simultaneously, saying something as well.
This idea is often associated with Joel Feinberg, who identifies it as
the expressive function of punishment.26 On Feinberg’s analysis, the
institution of legal punishment does not simply involve the giving of an
unwelcome consequence; many legal results, from fines to judgments in
civil suits, have that character. Legal punishment in the full-blooded
sense, in contrast, brings with it both the unwelcome result and the sense
of public disapprobation.27 To simplify things somewhat, no one believes
that a parking ticket is intended to express the antipathy of the community
toward the tardy parker, and no one believes that the tardy parker ought
to feel shame in virtue of some such judgment. The sentence of
imprisonment, in contrast, does bring with it some notion that shame is
appropriate and that a judgment legitimating such shame has emerged
from the process of adjudication. Even a day’s worth of imprisonment,
said the Supreme Court in Robinson v. California, was cruel and unusual
as punishment for the “crime” of being an addict;28 Feinberg’s theory
explains this with reference to the fact that there, the stigmatization
associated with legal incarceration was not legitimate. Punishment,
again, is not simply an unwelcome consequence but an act of speech.29
Ideas like these seem to help explain what the ICC is trying to do and
why it might be right to try to do it.30 The ICC, I have said, is an institution
26. See Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 MONIST 397,
400–03 (1965).
27. Id. at 401–02.
28. 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
29. Feinberg, supra note 26, at 402–03.
30. Robert Sloane and David Luban express similar ideas about the function of
the ICC. Luban defends the idea that the ICC should be seen as norm generating, and
Sloane discusses the idea that the sentencing function of the court should be judged with
reference to the expressive function of the criminal law. See David Luban, Fairness to
Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of International Criminal Law, in
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that is trying to damn the memory of wrongdoers. If punishment helps
in this process, then perhaps that is enough of a good reason to engage in
punishment. I believe these ideas are a good place to start, but I want to
be careful. I do not think the expressive function of punishment is sufficient
as a justification of punishment. Feinberg does not think it sufficient
either—he identifies this as a function of an institutional practice that
must receive its justification elsewhere.31 If, in other words, we have this
institution in place, and if it is conventionally associated with the
communication of messages, then we are able to examine these messages
and these conventions to see if they are morally appropriate. It is not
enough for us to say that we are able to punish because that is how we
send messages. Many violent things communicate messages—from an
invasion to a hate crime—and we judge them in virtue of their violence
and not solely in virtue of the rightness of their messages.
So, if we want to use the idea of an expressive function for punishment,
and if we want to explore this idea as a way of justifying the ICC, we
still have some questions to ask. The first, and most obvious, is why we
are not doing wrong in choosing a punitive message for communicating
our disapproving message. Feinberg, after all, imagines a nonviolent
ceremony of disavowal as a replacement for some parts of punishment;
we might imagine the same for our treatment of war criminals.32 The
second, and more vexing, is just what message it is that international
legal process is trying to communicate. To whom is the message addressed?
What is the message? What, in short, does the ICC actually say?
I will address the former question in Part III. For now, though, I want
to examine the latter question and spend some time trying to figure out
how to understand the ICC as a discursive institution. We can turn, then,
to the idea that there is a certain pattern of speech in any democratic

THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 569, 576–77 (Samantha Besson & John
Tasioulas eds., 2010) (discussing the value of norm generating on the international
landscape); Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: The
Limits of the National Law Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law, 43
STAN. J. INT’L L. 39, 88–91 (2007) (arguing that international sentencing should be
undergone with criminal law’s expressive function in mind). I do not want here to
disagree with either Sloane or Luban; I want instead to get slightly clearer on what sorts
of norms we are trying to create and what sort of proposition the court is actually trying
to communicate.
31. See Feinberg, supra note 26, at 423.
32. Id. at 420.
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political community that is properly understood as part of that community’s
constitutional structure.
II. MORAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE REALM OF THE SPEAKABLE
There are limits on speech in every community. The limits are legal,
in the first instance; even the United States—a comparative outlier in
free speech jurisprudence—brings legal force to bear against certain
forms of speech, including libel, slander, obscenity, and the like. I am
not primarily concerned with these limits, interesting though they are.
I am more concerned with the fact that each community has a set of
ideas and concepts that can be invoked in public in the justification of
political practice and a corresponding set of ideas and concepts that are
anathema. The former set might be understood, without too much abuse,
as extending outward from John Rawls’s concept of public reason,
which he describes as involving the use of certain ideas that present in
the “public political culture” of a well-ordered democratic society.33
Rawls’s ideas here are simultaneously descriptive and normative; they
seek to guide the deliberations of a just democracy existing under
circumstances of reasonable pluralism, and they depend for their
plausibility upon the existence of a set of ideas that could be relied upon
to recognize as politically appropriate.34 I am not here directly concerned
with Rawls’s arguments so much as I want to emphasize what Rawls did
not: the existence of ideas within the public political culture entails the
existence of some ideas that are firmly and rightly regarded as outside
that political culture. Rawls thought some of these ideas—nonpublic
reasons stemming from comprehensive doctrines and sectarian views—
had appropriate places within which they should be applied.35 He did
not concern himself too greatly with the emotional reaction we might
think reasonable to find when we encounter those reasons elsewhere.
Rawls was, famously, a theorist of the reasonable. But I think it is
plausible to think that one way we have of supporting Rawls’s vision is
to think that some ideas are not simply private but unspeakable—
unspeakable in public and in political life. We recognize some of these
reasons as being so likely to lead to the violation of basic rights and
norms that the use of these ideas is rightly regarded as shameful, rather
than simply a violation of the norms of public reason.
Those of us who live within democratic cultures learn the limits of the
speakable, even if we feel no particular desire to say the things that are
33.
34.
35.

916

JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 7–9, 212–13 (1993).
See id. at 212–13.
See id. at 220 & n.7.
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politically unspeakable. We are all aware that there are reasons and
arguments that can be presented without shame, and those that cannot. It
is now, for instance, much less socially acceptable to be a simple gutter
racist in public than it was in the 1960s. Those people who are, in fact,
racists find themselves compelled to alter at least what they say in public
so that they are able to insist upon their own antipathy toward racism.
This was the source, famously, of Henry Louis Gates’s rejection of hate
speech laws: they punish only those racists lacking enough sophistication to
hide their racism.36 They punish, in other words, those who are both
racist and badly educated.37
I do not want to celebrate this shift as a major accomplishment; the
sophisticated racist is not morally superior to the gutter bigot. But it is,
politically speaking, a step forward, when arguments that simply refer to
the innate inferiority of a particular part of humanity no longer count as
politically viable. We are, I think, in the middle of a similar change in the
area of same-sex relationships. Even as recently as the 1990s, homophobic
legislation could be grounded in a simple aversion to same-sex desire.
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Windsor, in
contrast, identified simple antipathy toward homosexuals as an inadequate
ground for state action.38 We are not there yet, but it may soon be the
case that simple gutter homophobia is as unspeakable as simple gutter
racism.
Different societies, of course, have different sorts of things that are
politically unspeakable, and these differences may reflect very good
reasons—reasons stemming, notably, from the particular pasts that have
given rise to existing wounds within those societies. We have good
reason to think that what is speakable within one society—what might
not be reasonable, on Rawls’s tests, but what should perhaps be regarded
as not worthy of scorn and marginalization—should be utter anathema
within another. It is one thing for a talk radio host in New Jersey to refer
to a disfavored group as human vermin; it is quite another for Valerie
36. Henry Louis Gates Jr., Let Them Talk, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 20 & 27, 1993, at
37, 45–46.
37. Id.
38. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). Indeed, there were “audible gasp[s]” in the courtroom
when Justice Kagan read some of the purported rational bases offered for the Defense of
Marriage Act upon its passage in 1996. See Maura Dolan, Supreme Court Likely To
Strike Down DOMA, Experts Say, L.A. T IMES (Mar. 27, 2013), http://articles.latimes
.com/2013/mar/27/local/la-me-lanow-doma-react-gay-20130327 (describing the “intake of
breath” when Justice Alito described same-sex couples as “loving and committed”).
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Bemeriki to do it in Rwanda.39 It is, similarly, one thing for a British
man to sing the praises of his nation’s heroes and quite another for a man
in Germany to sing the Horst Wessel Lied. The difference between the
cases is not simply the legal effects—in the latter disjunct, in both cases,
legal consequences did or would follow from the acts of speech.40 The
difference is, instead, that the context and history of the words make
speaking them a very different thing, politically speaking. Where there
is a situation in which widespread human rights abuses are possible—
where, notably, it is possible because it has already happened—we have
a stronger reason to use the forces of repression to anathematize and
marginalize certain forms of speech. Germany after the Holocaust has
made Nazi symbolism and speech criminally prohibited, but it has also
created a form of social universe in which ideas redolent of Nazism are
to be recognized and condemned simply in virtue of that fact. Nazi ideas
are not literally unspeakable, of course—they continue to be spoken, all
too often—but they are politically unspeakable, in that they cannot and
will not be taken seriously as part of the ongoing process of political
discourse. They are unspeakable by virtue of this fact: they will not be
given the basic respect owed to the political speech acts of a fellow citizen.
With these ideas in mind, we might return to the issue of the ICC.
What exactly is it that the ICC is trying to do, if it is viewed as a discursive
institution? If it is trying to anathematize, to make shameful, how
exactly is that to be accomplished? To answer these questions, we might
return briefly to the world of Domitian. Domitian’s damnatio was
intended to remove Domitian from the world of political justification.41
This was a world in which most dead Caesars could expect to dwell;
former rulers became part of the set of institutions to which current
rulers could appeal, both in justifying their acts to the public and in the
process of political negotiation.42 It is worth noting in this context that
the army, which rather liked Domitian, tried unsuccessfully to have him
made a god after his death; being a god was, rhetorically speaking, a
way of emphasizing that Domitian’s relevance should continue after his
death.43 The damnatio, I think, might be viewed as having three related
elements, none of them especially sharply distinguished from each other.
The first is that it seeks to remove the idea that the person damned is an
39. For more about Valerie Bemeriki, see Dele Olojede, When Words Could Kill,
NEWSDAY (Long Island, N.Y.), May 4, 2004, at A37, available at 2004 WLNR 1088687.
40. See Ben Camm-Jones, Apple Removes Nazi Anthem from German iTunes,
TECHWORLD (Jan. 28, 2011, 1:06 PM), http://news.techworld.com/sme/3258503/appleremoves-nazi-anthem-from-german-itunes/.
41. See VARNER, supra note 3, at 111.
42. Id.
43. See SUETONIUS, supra note 1, at 361.
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authority—someone whose ideas are worth taking seriously because that
person is the one who produced them. After the damnatio, Domitian was
not someone who could be raised within the senate as a way of giving extra
weight to a particular view or policy.44
The second is that it sought to remove the idea that the damned could
properly be understood as a hero. Roman emperors, naturally, had a
lengthy afterlife as exemplars of virtue; the ones who were beloved
received the same glow of approbation as is currently assigned to modern
celebrities.45 On this view, the damnatio was intended to dispel the
tendency we have to think that the politically great are morally good. To
say that someone was showing the political judgment of a Domitian,
after the damnatio, meant something quite different from what it might
have meant to say that someone was acting like a Caesar or a Solon.
The final thing I want to note is that the damnatio is intended to
permanently cast a pall of disreputability over certain forms of political
argument—those employed by the damned. Strictly speaking, of course,
we should not engage in ad hominem evaluation of arguments; each
argument should stand or fall on its merits. In practice, naturally, people
are not that rational, and the fact that the despised once made an
argument counts as a reason to regard that argument as presumptively
worthy of being despised—think, in this connection, of Godwin’s Law,
the theory that every Internet argument eventually involves comparing
one’s opponent to Hitler.46 After all, Domitian was not merely a doer
but a figure who gave reasons for his actions, often rather complex ones
involving the nature of religion and the infelicities of the Christian
faith.47 Eusebius records that the Christians exiled from Rome by
Domitian were urged to return after his death; this was done, we might
think, not because the Christians were beloved but in part because
Domitian himself was so hated that his patterns of reasoning should be
regarded as presumptively erroneous.48
44. See VARNER, supra note 3, at 2.
45. See WILLIAM E. DUNSTAN, ANCIENT ROME 317 (2011) (“[Trajan’s] reputation
as the model ruler lived on down the centuries and eventually reached legendary
proportions—Dante singled him out from all other non-Christian emperors for a place in
Paradise . . . .”).
46. Godwin’s Law Definition, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/
view/Entry/340583 (last visited Feb. 18, 2014).
47. See DUNSTAN, supra note 45, at 306–07.
48. See EUSEBIUS, THE HISTORY OF THE CHURCH FROM CHRIST TO CONSTANTINE
82 (Andrew Louth ed., G. A. Williamson trans., Penguin Books rev. ed. 1989) (1965).
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We may leap forward now from Domitian to Thomas Lubanga Dyilo.
I believe the ICC’s condemnation of Lubanga has a strong similarity to
these three forms of authoritative condemnation. In the first instance,
the idea that Lubanga is the antithesis of a hero is rather obviously the
focus of the judgment against him. In its sentencing decision, the court
emphasized the gruesome nature of his crime and the innocence of the
children he sent to their deaths.49 This should not be a surprise; the
moral depravity of a criminal is relevant to sentencing, both within domestic
jurisprudence and within the ICC. What I want to suggest, though, is
that the justifying purpose of the ICC here is found in precisely this
communication of moral disapprobation. In domestic jurisprudence, we
might think that whether or not someone watching the trial regards the
defendant as heroic is largely a matter of irrelevance. Many people, for
example, still write to Charles Manson; the civil society of America persists.50
In the ICC, though, the communication that these acts were not heroic—
that Lubanga sought out the most vulnerable members of his society and
destroyed them for selfish gain—seems to be the best way of justifying
the enterprise itself. The ICC is trying, through what it says and the
meaning of what it does, to send the message that Lubanga is not just
worthy of being punished by the court but worthy of being seen as
contemptible by his own society.
I think similar things might be said about the other two aspects of the
damnatio I have identified. The ICC’s decisions emphasized that Lubanga
was, in fact, a reasonable being.51 In the ICC’s conviction, the court
depicted Lubanga as a political leader who built a thriving party with a
platform he personally helped create.52 This emphasis is not simply to
make the case that Lubanga was no victim of circumstance. Instead, it is
to emphasize that Lubanga himself was a figure who used reason, and
who used it badly. As such, we have reason to think that the specific ways
in which he argued—the justifications he offered for warfare and for his
decisions within warfare—are arguments we ought to regard as shameful,
presumptively not just wrong but evil. Indeed, the ICC does try to
delegitimize Lubanga as both a model for political agency and a provider of
political reasons. He is neither hero nor authority; instead, reasons he
49. See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision
on Sentence, ¶¶ 36–50, 57–78 (July 10, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc
1438370.pdf.
50. David Macaray, Charles Manson and Me, HUFFINGTON POST CRIME BLOG
(Oct. 4, 2011, 5:55 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-macaray/charles-mansonand-me_b_994638.html.
51. See Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, ¶¶ 54–56.
52. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment,
¶ 1356 (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1379838.pdf.
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provided for political action should be removed from the world of
respectable political speech.
That, I think, is the message that the court is trying to send. Of course,
it is true that domestic courts say similar things. I believe, however, that
the difference is that domestic courts rightly regard this sort of discursive
practice as an element added to an independently justified practice of
legitimate punishment. We punish, that is, because it is right to do so,
and if that punishment communicates what ought to be communicated to
others, then so much the better. If not—if no message can be communicated,
for example, because a desert island society is about to dissolve—then
we should not worry. The expressive function of punishment is a means
by which domestic societies might make themselves better off, by using
an already-justified practice for purposes of social reprobation.
Internationally, in contrast, I think this is in fact the best story we have
about why these institutions ought to be set up. This is, again, a theory
of discontinuity; despite the similar appearance of the two forms of
practice, they are justified in rather different ways. The purpose of the
punishment of Lubanga, on this view, is not to give Lubanga what he
deserves; to be blunt, no human institution could do that. Nor is the purpose
to directly incentivize good behavior by imposing a sort of tax on future
wrongdoers. Lubanga was not effectively deterred by the existence of
the ICC, and it seems to be quite unlikely that future Lubangas will face
a different set of incentives. The ICC is speaking neither to Lubanga nor
to those who might choose to emulate him. Instead, it is seeking to create a
new form of constitutional community—a constitution, again, that is as
much a matter of shared political will as of legal institutions. This
community is defined, as all are, by a set of heroes and reasons and
arguments that can be appealed to in public political discourse. The ICC
is best justified, on this view, as a way of setting limits to this discourse
after the radical failure of that community to follow the dictates of morality.
The ICC is, again, a thoroughly political institution, not political in the
discreditable sense—despite the criticisms I offer above; the ICC is not
to be dismissed as parochial—but political in that its proper target is the
creation of a new political community.53
53. Scott Shapiro and Michael Ramsey have both pressed upon me the idea that
the ICC might be justified as a sort of precommitment strategy: the ICC forces signatory
states to commit to the punishment of those who violate human rights, and the ICC’s
most basic threat is to take over that punishing function if the state drags its feet. This is
undoubtedly true, but I believe the best explanation of the ICC must make reference to
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Is this analysis plausible when deployed as a justification for the ICC?
Whether it is depends upon factual arguments I have no way of making;
I am not an empirical scholar, and I try to avoid pretending to be one.
I do have to say that I find it not obviously implausible and believe there
is some minimal amount of evidence from history that might give us
reason to accept it. Compare, for instance, the reaction of Germany and
Japan to the recognition of atrocity following the Second World War.
The denazification process was wide ranging within Germany and
included both legal trials against individual Germans and the extirpation
of Nazi symbols and ideas from German social life.54 Germany has made
Holocaust denial unspeakable, both legally and morally; the legal concept
of volksverhetzung has made Nazi ideas legally condemnable under
some circumstances,55 but the trials at Nuremberg began a more broad
social process making such ideas socially monstrous as well.56 To diminish
the moral depravity of the Holocaust in modern Germany is to make
oneself unworthy of engagement as a political agent.
Japan, in contrast, has proven to be more resistant to the recognition of
the atrocities occurring during the occupation of Manchuria. Social
attitudes toward past atrocities are complex, but the idea that such
atrocities are potentially defensible is a live one within Japanese political
culture. A Japanese mayor made headlines in May 2013 for defending
the sexual slavery of Korean women during the Second World War;
such practices, he said, were necessary for military discipline.57 To be
fair, there was some outrage at this statement, both at home and abroad,
and we may be heartened by this fact.58 We should, however, be equally
dismayed that the statement was made at all.

what it is that the court does; why is the court allowed to punish individual people?
What does it hope to gain by doing so? If the ICC were simply a treaty that authorized
harsh treatment against states that were unable or unwilling to punish their own, we
might have been satisfied with any number of ways in which this harsh treatment might
be doled out. The use of criminal procedure against individual lawbreakers would be
one of any number of possible ways of prompting states to do their jobs. I believe, even
if we conceive of the ICC as a precommitment strategy, we ought to conceive of the
court as a body that uses legal norms against individual persons and see what reason that
court might have for doing so.
54. See, e.g., FREDERICK TAYLOR, EXORCISING HITLER: THE OCCUPATION AND
DENAZIFICATION OF GERMANY (2011).
55. See STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], Nov. 13, 1998, Bundesgesetzblatt
[BGBL.] 3322, as amended, § 130(4) (Ger.).
56. See generally TAYLOR, supra note 54 (chronicling the postwar occupation and
denazification of Germany).
57. See Hiroko Tabuchi, Women Sent to Brothels Aided Japan, Mayor Says, N.Y.
TIMES, May 14, 2013, at A7.
58. Id.
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It is difficult, if not impossible, to say why this difference between
Japan and Germany should have emerged. One factor might be the
comparative weight placed by the Allies upon the Nuremberg tribunal,
rather than upon the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.59
These latter trials also included a comparatively greater grant of sovereign
immunity; notably, the emperor and his family were entirely free from any
threat of prosecution.60 There was, perhaps, more cynicism in the
conduct of these trials, as well; Shiro Ishii, responsible for vivisection and
other human experimentation at the covert Japanese military biowarfare
research program Unit 731, was allowed to go free in exchange for the
medical data his torture had produced.61 I think it at least plausible that
an international trial, properly conducted, may have the effect of producing
the right sort of shame following evil by marginalizing and shaming
those who perpetrated the worst of it. I also believe, though I acknowledge
I am not able to adequately ground my contention, that Nuremberg had
some part to play in setting the framework for what can and cannot be
said in modern Germany. As a final point, I am convinced that if we
want to justify the ICC, we have reason to look to this sort of function,
rather than to more traditional conceptions of punishment.62
All of this is to say only that the ICC might have a role to play in
setting the stage for modern democratic states to emerge after atrocity.
We might worry that this ignores the central concern about punitive
institutions: whether they have the right to punish at all. What I propose
here is that the ICC is properly understood as a sort of discursive institution,
justified with reference to its ability to create a democratic community.
What this might seem to obscure is the fact that this discourse involves

59. See MADOKA FUTAMURA, WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE:
THE TOKYO TRIAL AND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 8–11 (2008).
60. See id. at 63, 121.
61. See DANIEL BARENBLATT, A PLAGUE UPON HUMANITY: THE SECRET GENOCIDE
OF AXIS JAPAN’S GERM WARFARE OPERATION 207, 210–11, 223 (2004); Nicholas D.
Kristof, Japan Confronting Gruesome War Atrocity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1995, at A1.
62. I would also be cautious before asserting that the approach I offer here is the
only way in which these institutions might be justified; it is always possible that some
other sorts of considerations—perhaps, the need to acknowledge the drive for vengeance
while minimizing the damage that drive creates—might also be invoked in justification
of the ICC. I am skeptical about the ability of such ideas to ground the court as it exists,
but I do not here try to argue that these ideas could not do the job. I am grateful to Don
Dripps for discussion of this point.
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putting people like Lubanga in jail—in his case, for fourteen years.63
What right do we have to do that? Is this not simply another case of
using people for the benefits of others? It is to these worries that I will
now turn.
III. RADICAL EVIL AND POLITICAL SOCIETY
The worry I have identified above is a powerful one. Those of us who
are deontic thinkers tend to worry about deterrence-based theories of
punishment precisely because they tend to justify causing harm to some
with reference to the benefits given to others. Rawls’s criticism of
utilitarianism began with just this fact: utilitarians cannot take seriously
the separateness of persons and therefore cannot accept the moral
inviolability of the individual.64 I do not mean to contravene this fact.
Indeed, in the area of domestic punishment, I accept that we cannot
justify causing harm to one simply with reference to the greater wellbeing of another. What can we say, then, about the legitimacy of using
Lubanga’s person as a way of making a constitutional point?
There are two things I want to emphasize here about why this might
not be as morally problematic as it might at first seem. The first is the
transitional context in which this punishment is occurring; the second is
the notion that radical evil might give rise, in this context, to legitimate
forms of rights forfeiture. These two ideas are deeply related, but I will
try to discuss them separately.
We can begin with the idea that the punishment of Lubanga is
occurring within a context of transitional justice—transitional between
the absence of legitimate government institutions and their presence.
This is an inevitable part of the ICC’s mandate; it has no role to play
when government institutions are able and willing to do their job. It is
not allowed, for example, to simply take over an existing set of
legitimate institutions because it might do the job they do better.65 This
fact is hardly news; we are aware that the place within which the ICC
acts must necessarily be one in which the institutions of government
have been absent. What I want to emphasize, though, is that the idea of
transition has two sides. The first is that we are transitioning toward just
governance. The second is that we are transitioning away from anarchy
and lawlessness and importantly, that we have not yet in fact entirely
escaped from those circumstances. I do not want to oversell the claim; I

63. See Marlise Simons, Congolese Warlord Draws First Sentence from International
Criminal Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2012, at A4.
64. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 27–29 (1971).
65. See Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 5, § 1.
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do not think that the ICC always acts against a backdrop of pure anarchy.
Very few places, however badly run, have ever had that character. But,
insofar as it is acting after atrocity and in place of weak institutions that
are insufficient to defend the domestic rule of law, the ICC is involved in
acting against a backdrop in which those domestic institutions are anemic
and ineffectual at best. I think it is important to recognize that where there
is the absence of such governing institutions, we may have the right to do
to people’s bodies what we would not ordinarily be able to consider
doing. After all, just war theory presupposes that there is a difference in
what we can do to people during warfare and what we can do to them
while in a state of civil society.66 Indeed, although this is somewhat
controversial, it seems true that those who are war criminals might in fact
be justly subject to forms of violence we could not even conceive of
accepting as part of civil society—including the imposition of a violent
death without due process. Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau
believed that the appropriate response to the Nazi hierarchy was
summary execution.67 Although I believe we have all benefitted from
the existence of the Nuremberg tribunals, I do not think Morgenthau was
mistaken in his belief that such execution would have been no moral
wrong against those executed.68 The simple fact is that warfare is
different and that the ways in which people must treat each other may be
different as well. When it acts to transition away from war, the ICC still
acts with one foot in the rules and practices of modern warfare. It is
setting up a constitutional system, not acting within one. As such, it is
possibly true that those who—like Lubanga—are to be used to make a
political point have no particular right to be free from such treatment.
To be clear, I do not want to make the case that people like Lubanga
have no rights. They have the same moral rights as all persons. But I do
want to emphasize that there is a difference between the rights we are
morally entitled to expect within a domestic political system and the
66. See generally ROBERT W. TUCKER, THE JUST WAR: A STUDY IN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN DOCTRINE (1960) (discussing justifications for the use of force).
67. The “Morgenthau plan” went beyond simply the summary execution of the
Nazi leadership and entailed the permanent destruction of Germany as a military or
industrial power. GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS
OF WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 151, 157 (2000).
68. See id. at 152 (“Morgenthau spent much of 1944 bombarding the White House
with proposals for harsh treatment of Germany after the war—part and parcel of which
was the summary execution of many Nazi war criminals. He had no patience for plodding
legalism. His justice was to be swift and terrible.”).
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comparatively thin rights we have under international human rights law.
Those who transgress against domestic law may have a right, by virtue
of their status as objects of that complex system of laws, to be treated as
equal in comparison to other persons coerced by that law; they may have
a strong moral right to be treated in ways that do not depend upon a
showing of benefits to others. Those who transgress against international
law, in contrast, violate those norms that are themselves definitive of
what can count as a legitimate system of domestic law.69 They do, insofar
as it is within their power, act to bring us back to a system of war. We
may be allowed to use tools and ideas within war that would not be
acceptable within a system of domestic law. We should not pretend, in
other words, that the ICC is acting against a backdrop akin to that of the
domestic legal system; the ICC acts only when that most basic set of
moral guarantees has ceased to exist and thus acts only when the world
has returned to war.70 We should not think that those who act to bring us
out of war are obligated to act as if they have already done so; we cannot
confuse the moment of founding with the rules that hold sway after that
founding. To use Arthur Applbaum’s pithy saying, “All foundings are
forced.”71 This fact may permit us to use Lubanga in a manner that we
could not imagine for even the most heinous domestic criminal.
This brings us to the second aspect of international criminal law worth
examining. Those who are punished under the ICC have committed acts
that are best described as morally shocking—not simply illegal or worthy of
condemnation, but radically evil. It is possible for us to think that such
people—who have systematically rejected and ignored the human dignity of
others—no longer have the right to morally reject the sorts of treatment I
imagine here. They would be, at the very least, caught in a sort of
performative contradiction; in protesting their treatment, they insist upon
a principle—the moral relevance of humanity—that they themselves
have consistently refused to uphold. I want to be very careful here; I do
not think that ideas like this license us in treating those we punish in
domestic law as having forfeited their right to treatment as a moral
equal. This is the case domestically because the institutions are trying to
punish, which involves the attempt to do something that—on the retributive
view at least—involves treating the criminal as a moral agent entitled to

69. For a justification of this way of looking at international law, see ANNA STILZ,
LIBERAL LOYALTY: FREEDOM, OBLIGATION, AND THE STATE (2011).
70. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
71. Arthur Isak Applbaum, Forcing a People To Be Free, 35 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
359, 400 (2007).
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equality.72 It is also worth noting, I think, that domestic legal institutions—
in a stable democratic state—can survive treating even the worst persons
with respect. Internationally, though, we might think that the ICC is
doing something that necessarily involves justifying harsh treatment
with reference toward the good of some future political community, in
which the criminal may not indeed have any part. If this is permissible,
it might be because the criminal in question has committed acts of a
character sufficient to thoroughly lose the right to be free from being so
used. Christopher Heath Wellman has recently proposed this as a picture of
punishment more generally; on this analysis, punishment is permissible
in virtue of the rights the criminal has forfeited by his choice to act
within crime.73 I am not confident that I accept this as a picture of domestic
punishment—I am also not confident I do not—but I do think that it
seems a plausible picture of how we might understand why we are
morally permitted to put Lubanga in jail. Lubanga, after all, is not being
punished as part of an ongoing system of legal punishment, defended by
a domestic state as part of its process of self-rule. He is, instead, engaging
in an illegitimate act of war. When Lubanga acts against the most basic
norms of international law and undermines the rights that individuals
have under those norms, he removes from himself the right to complain
when we use force against him. If we use that force as part of the process of
building a new society, in which Lubanga and those who would follow
him have no part, he has no complaint against us.74
These ideas are jarring. Most of us recoil from the idea that we might
punish some with a view toward the edification of others. I would note,
however, that nothing in what I have said here allows us to go further
than what the ICC is currently doing in seeking to impose punishment
upon individuals only after a fair trial. Nothing in these ideas allows us
to engage in punishment against the innocent; only in actually committing a
crime against the basic rights of others does an individual become a
legitimate subject of punishment, and the criminal trial is required for us
72. E.g., Dan Markel, Executing Retributivism: Panetti and the Future of the
Eighth Amendment, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1163, 1184 (2009).
73. See Christopher Heath Wellman, The Rights Forfeiture Theory of Punishment,
122 ETHICS 371, 371–76 (2012).
74. Lori Watson pointed out that part of the process might involve the testimony
of the victims of such abusers as part of the process of extirpation; I have focused on the
role of the accused and of the institution of the court itself, but I agree with Watson that
the voice of the victim might be a valuable part of the process of rebuilding a social world in
which such victimization does not occur.
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to be confident in our belief that this individual is legally and factually
guilty. Moreover, the ICC is duty bound to demonstrate what the rule of
law looks like so as to create a model by which the rule of law might be
created. I have said here that the ICC is justified, in part, because it acts
within a context in which law has ceased to hold.75 However, nothing in
that context permits the court to act contrary to the morality of individual
rights that animates law itself. The court may not be justified with
reference to the same ideas that justify domestic courts. It should, however,
hold itself to similar standards of procedural and substantive fairness.
All of this is necessarily a rough sketch, but I hope it might suffice to
give some plausibility to the idea that the ICC’s best justification might
have very little to do with punishment as ordinarily understood. If
punishment is justified in the ways we ordinarily try to justify it, the ICC
may not have much to recommend it. If we think of the ICC instead as a
form of constitutional act—as the use of the language and procedure of
modern legal punishment in service of the constitutional project—then
the ICC may be better equipped to present itself as justifiable. The ICC,
on this analysis, sets out the future of a society after atrocity by seeking
to invoke the shame that is conventionally associated with punishment in
service of the constitutional project. For domestic courts, it is the sentence
and harsh treatment that make punishment what it is. For the ICC, I
suggest, the most important part of the process is the verdict itself. What
matters most, morally speaking, is not that bad people have a bad time
but that such bad people are forever damned as unworthy of admiration
and emulation.
What could we take away from these ideas? I will conclude with only
two ideas that might emerge from this Article. The first is that the ICC
is justified, if it is, with reference to what is likely to emerge from it.
The justification I offer here is sufficient to justify the ICC only if the
ICC and institutions like it actually are able to marginalize and stigmatize
those who are evil. What evidence there is about this proposition is sketchy.
It is disheartening to see that William Ruto, recently elected as Kenya’s
Deputy President, was able to use his ICC indictment as a form of
credentialing.76 This suggests, I think, that the ICC should be extremely
careful in how it presents itself. If we are seeking to engage in punishment
as we ordinarily understand it, we have some prudential reason to avoid
triumphalism, be modest in our claims, and so on. If our goal is instead
the creation of a constitutional project, we have a much stronger moral
reason to be careful about how much we think we can do. Those who
75.
76.
at A25.
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are punished by an international body will be stigmatized only if those
within their society accept that body’s right to stigmatize. This suggests
that the ICC should be careful about overreaching. Even if it were not
already jurisdictionally limited in its ability to replace the deliberations
of domestic political societies, it would have a strong moral reason to
avoid replacing such deliberations. A principle of subsidiarity, in other
words, seems defensible not just legally but morally.
This leads me to my final point: we should resist the idea that the ICC
is a court like any other court. Indeed, this has been what I have been
trying to establish all along. What I want to say here is that the
discontinuity between the ICC and other courts should be sufficient to
make us think that the ICC is best understood as something genuinely
extraordinary. We should not be misled by the superficial similarity
between the ICC and other forms of legal institutions. The ICC is, on
my analysis, something that exists only when domestic law fails. In
other words, it is best understood as having relevance only under
circumstances of moral catastrophe. There is some controversy between
different scholars as to the ambitions that the ICC should eventually
have; should it limit itself to the core human abuses, or should it try to
become something grander?77 I believe we are right to regard the ICC as
something much more like an emergency response to an emergency
situation; it is not a domestic court writ large but something more like a
standing army—an institution ready and waiting for the tragic circumstances
in which its powers become relevant. I cannot defend this conclusion
here. I think what I have said, though, may give us reason to think that
the ICC involves doing things—and saying things through that doing—
that are genuinely extraordinary and that should not be regarded as the
simple international extension of domestic law. Once again, though, I
cannot defend such conclusions; I will close simply by reasserting them.
The ICC, as I understand it, may be best justified with reference to the
ways in which it reshapes the future of a domestic society. An
international criminal court understood in such a manner might be more
modest in how much it thinks it can accomplish; it might also, however,
be more justifiable than it would be if read as a simple institution of
legal punishment.

77. I am grateful to Jamie Mayerfeld for discussion of these issues, even though
he would not likely agree with the conclusions.
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